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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# INFORMATION REPOR[illegible]

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|---|---|---|---|
| COUNTRY | Czechoslovakia | REPORT | |
| SUBJECT | Sabotage in Czechoslovak Industry | DATE DISTR. | 3 May 1955 |
| | | | 50X1 |
| | | NO. OF PAGES | 4 |
| DATE OF INFO. | | REQUIREMENT NO. | |
| PLACE ACQUIRED | | REFERENCES | |

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THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES (21)

| | |
|---|---|
| 3-02-0406 | 5/55 |
| 134 | 27M |
| 9/741.7 | 27M (+1) |
| 9/742 | 27M |
| 111.2 | 27M |
| 111.22 | 27M |

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

| STATE | #X | ARMY | #X | NAVY | #X | AIR | #X | FBI | | AEC | | | | | |
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(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

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CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO.

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia

DATE DISTR. 22 Mar. 1955

SUBJECT Sabotage in Czechoslovak Industry

NO. OF PAGES 3

50X1

DATE OF INFORMATION

REFERENCES: ILLEGIB

PLACE ACQUIRED

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1. Source did not believe there was a significant amount of deliberate sabotage in Czechoslovak industry. He knew about only one case of sabotage of this kind at MEZ Vsetin in Vsetin (N 49-20, E 18-00), where strong-current electric machinery was produced. This case occurred during 1950 when sand was found several times in the bearings of various machine tools. Source did not know the importance of the damage because the management attempted to hush up the whole affair. In 1952, a group of about 10 young people damaged the spur track connecting the Zbrojovka armament plant in Vsetin with the main Vsetin-Puchov (N 49-08, E 18-20) railroad line. Disregarding the value of such action as far as morale was concerned, the actual damage was insignificant; however, the perpetrators were discovered and tried in a public trial in Vsetin. Source heard of no serious deliberate sabotage during recent years.

2. On the other hand, machines at MEZ Vsetin developed minor operational defects rather frequently and it was difficult to say whether the failures were caused intentionally or whether they simply resulted from careless work. There were instances, for example, where small pieces of wire were found in the winding of electric motors, thus causing short circuits.

3. On the basis of source's experience with the operation of Czechoslovak industrial enterprises under the Communist régime and on the basis of his knowledge of technical personnel, source had several suggestions to offer concerning psychological warfare which he believed might have positive results if properly handled through radio broadcasts to Czechoslovakia or through the leaflet program.

4. Source does not believe the people should be urged to cause direct significant sabotage. The Communist régime has been in existence for a long time in Czechoslovakia; many of the people are getting tired and somewhat accustomed to life under the Communists; and, therefore, they feel no direct and immediate impulse to initiate serious sabotage. Because of the thorough police system, the risk



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of apprehension when committing direct and serious damage is very great. Police investigations are frequent and exhaustive. Whenever a reject product of even slight significance was found at MEZ Vsetin, the chief designers and chief technicians of the testing plant were investigated by the StB regarding the matter. Some of these technicians were convinced CP members. Source believed the StB came to Vsetin from Uherske Hradiste (N 49-04, E 17-27) and that investigations took place at the local police station. Source did not know who had the duty of informing the police of the fact that a reject had been produced; however, he believed that this was done by the plant manager himself and by the chief of the Section for Special Tasks. This section, according to source, was actually the former Security Section which had been given a new name.

5. Not only would a technician, regardless of whether he were a low-ranking factory engineer or a research and development worker, risk almost certain discovery and apprehension if he committed sabotage; but, it is not likely that he would even wish to commit direct sabotage. It is the nature of a technician to perform his work well. This is especially true of high-level technicians.

6. Because of the above-mentioned facts, source does not believe that technicians might reasonably be expected deliberately to commit significant sabotage in their work. However, he does believe that anti-Communist technicians, who make up the vast majority, would follow the advice of Western propaganda if urged to comply with the following suggestions:

a. To slow down, i.e., to retard their rate of work within reasonable limits so that they would not risk being reproached. For example, a designer might wait an additional week or so to hand over certain drawings.

b. To waste material, i.e., to design more powerful and heavier equipment than absolutely needed for the specific purpose. When effected on a large scale, this is a safe way to seriously harm the economy. Only very extreme cases might be called to the attention of the supervisors and the police. If reproached or blamed for the equipment being too heavily designed, the technician could always reply: "I tried to make it as safe as possible to be sure it would not fail since failure would cause much more damage than making it heavy". The propaganda might give examples of the fate of technicians who tried to modernize designs by making them lighter. For example, in 1951 or 1952, Ing. Vladimir Stol of the V.I. Lenin Works in Pilsen-Doudlevce was sentenced to two years in prison because his design for high-pressure breakers failed. In 1952 or 1953, Ing. Riha (fnu) of CKD Stalingrad designed a powerful generator which failed because it was not designed solidly enough. Riha committed suicide because of his fear of possible prosecution.

c. In order to counter the technician's tendency to improve procedures and develop new products, the propaganda should make it clear to technicians that they alone will be held responsible for possible failure. It is obvious and perfectly natural that there is always the risk of complete or partial failure when working on a major improvement or on research and development of a new product. In private industry this risk is assumed by the enterprise; under the Communist régime it should be assumed by the state; however, experience has shown that the Communist régime in Czechoslovakia holds the respective technicians responsible. Propaganda should give examples of



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what has happened to technicians who have tried to make technical improvements. The case of Dr. Ing. Vilem Klima[1], former manager of MEZ Development, might serve as an example. Klima was found guilty of sabotage by negligence and sentenced to prison. Source believed that Klima was only trying to find new ways of modernizing equipment.

d. Whenever the question arises as to whether or not a design should be modified and the Communists urge the modification, the technicians should not resist but should take the order as given. In such cases, a technician could not be held responsible for the suggested modification and the production slow-down because of the necessity for new drawings, tools, etc. Actually, the technician would gain the advantage of acquiring new experience.

e. Technicians who inspect and control the quality, appearance, and optimum operational capability of certain products should be urged to perform their duties scrupulously. They should refuse to accept all products with even small defects which, although not endangering their operability, make the products defective as far as conforming to prescriptions is concerned. Such a policy, when practiced on a large scale, would cause considerable delay in production. Not only technical inspectors but all employees should adhere to this policy whenever a scrupulous performance of their duties would cause delay.

f. Anti-Communist employees should be urged to support and encourage Communist officials in their effort to organize all types of schooling and training, be it professional or political. The Communist officials would be pleased to receive such support because they like to organize schooling and training in order to please their superiors. Actually, the only result of these training measures is that the workers and technicians become bored and even more disinterested in their work; their minds are constantly diverted in various ways; and, above all, the training and schooling takes time which could otherwise be spent working. At MEZ Vsetin, for example, an order was given that all young mechanics were to spend two hours daily for several months studying Theory of Electricity. The executive who gave this order was a convinced CP member who, in source's opinion, wanted to impress the Ministry of Engineering with the number of specialists in electricity his factory had educated or trained for the régime; however, this training took place just at a time when the factory was seriously behind in its production schedule.

g. Source believes the following to be especially important. It frequently happens in a factory that Communist executives or officials of every level make an effort to introduce new policies in production procedure, production methods, or administrative procedure. Their ideas and suggestions are usually very poor, sometimes so poor that one might believe that the CP officials themselves wanted to commit sabotage; however, the only reason for their inferior ideas is that they are incapable of understanding the problems. Here, the anti-Communist technicians should be urged by propaganda not to resist the Communists when introducing their innovations. The technicians should be urged to control their natural instinct to do things correctly; they should be passive and let the Communists do as they please. A great deal of economic harm might be accomplished in this way.

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